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POINT I, 
J. J. FUSSELL IS QUALIFIED TO PRACTICE AND TO 
BE LICENSED TO PRACTICE PSYCHOLOGY ON THE 
DOCTORAL LEVEL. 
The Agency has conceded in its Brief that J. J. Fussell is 
qualified to practice psychology at the doctoral level. (Agency' s 
Brief, page 23. ) The Agency recognizes as undisputed that Dr. 
Fussell is practicing psychology on the doctoral level in Utah as 
a staff psychologist at Weber State College. (1st. ) Then without 
support in the record or any other foundation, the Agency asserts 
that there is a difference between practicing psychology on the 
doctoral level and practicing independently as a licensed 
psychologist. The Agency implies that one practicing psychology on 
the doctoral level teaches, while a licensed psychologist 
independently practices psychology. This argument is without merit 
and is contrary to the evidence of record. 
The undisputed evidence indicates that Petitioner is not 
teaching at Weber State College, but is practicing psychology as a 
staff psychologist. l Her duties are essentially the same as they 
would be in a private practice setting as an independent, 
professional, licensed psychologist in the State of Utah. The 
Agency admits that Petitioner is qualified to continue in her 
current employment. (Agency's Brief at p. 24). But the Agency 
never explains why, if Petitioner is qualified to practice as a 
LDr. Southwick' s explanation of Dr. Fussell' s duties as a 
staff psychologist indicates that she has performed some teaching 
in the department of psychology at Weber State College, but only on 
an informal basis. (Transcript p. 76). 
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staff psychologist, she is not qualified to be licensed as a 
psychologist. In this regard, the State7 s argument is a non 
sequitur. 
The undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that J. J. 
Fussell is qualified to be licensed to practice as an independent 
psychologist on the doctoral level. Of the three witnesses 
presented by the Agency, only one had personal experience 
evaluating Dr. Fussell' s performance. That person, Dr. Addie 
Fuhrman, acknowledged as "good" her own experience with Dr. 
Fussell, which occurred in the counseling psychology internship 
program at the University of Utah. (R. 107-108. ) The witnesses who 
testified on behalf of the applicant were unqualifiedly positive 
about her qualifications. For example, Dr. Richard Southwick 
testified: 
"She's been an outstanding psychologist in the [Weber 
State] Counseling Center. . . . She is seen by her 
former clients as being valuable, as providing superb 
service, in being outstanding and meeting their needs. 
We have done co-therapy together on occasion, and that 
gives me an opportunity to see how she functions in that 
context. She makes presentations periodically in our in-
service meetings, which gives you some indication as to 
how she organizes, how she diagnoses, how she carries out 
her responsibilities. Those, too, have been more than 
satisfactory. 
(R. pp. 75-76. ) Those who observed Dr. Fussell' s performance in 
the University of Utah internship believed she was one of the best 
two interns to have ever participated in the program in its 
history. (Testimony of Drs. Morrill, Spinelli and Paul (R. 50-51, 
63-64 and 69-70. )) 
The testimony is unrebutted that had Dr. Fussell completed the 
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identical course of studies at the University of Utah, she would 
have received a doctoral degree in counseling psychology, and 
qualified for licensure under the Utah statute and regulations. 
The testimony is further unrebutted that Dr. Fussell has completed 
all of the distribution requirements set forth in Regulation R153-
25-8(4) (i). Even Drs. Malouf and Shenkenberg could not testify to 
the contrary, because they did not review her transcripts, course 
descriptions or syllabi.2 
The overarching consideration in evaluating Dr. Fussell' s 
licensure is that she be qualified and not present a risk to the 
public to practice psychology at the doctoral level. As is now 
apparently admitted by the State, Dr. Fussell is qualified to 
1
 Any inference to the contrary within Drs. Malouf and 
Shenkenberg' s testimony is wholly without foundation. Indeed, it 
is difficult to understand how these gentlemen could opine upon Dr. 
Fussell's academic qualifications without reviewing her course 
work. John Malouf testified: 
"I did not review the transcripts, because from where I sat, 
the thing I was looking at, it wasn' t really relevant what 
classes she had taken. I just didn't think, as I looked at 
it, that that was really an important factor. The important 
factor was: Is that a program designed to train psycholo-
gists?" 
(R. 130). Dr. Malouf later testified that Dr. Fussell's course 
requirements satisfied the licensing requirements as far as he 
knew, but reiterated that he did not review her transcripts with 
care. (R. 138. ) Dr. Shenkenberg, when asked what classes Dr. 
Fussell lacked or should have taken to qualify her for the practice 
of psychology at the doctoral level, stated that the course work 
Dr. Fussell had taken was not the issue. (R. 173-74. ) He stated 
that the Board had not reviewed Dr. Fussell's course work to check 
it out course by course to see if it qualified or not according to 
the statutory requirements. (R. 174. ) In contrast, Dr. Fuhrman, 
who testified on behalf of the Board, did review Dr. Fussell' s 
transcripts and course work, and when asked what Dr. Fussell might 
have taken or what would be required of another applicant to 
practice psychology at the doctorate level in Utah, answered ". . . I 
think she' s taken -- she' s probably taken more than she needs. " 
(R. 102-103. ) 
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practice psychology at the doctoral level in the State of Utah. 
Contrary to the Agency' s unexplained assertion, there is no 
distinction in qualificcitions or otherwise between practicing 
psychology on the doctoral level and practicing independently as a 
licensed psychologist. Undisputedly qualified to practice at the 
doctoral level, Dr. Fussell should now be licensed to do so. 
POINT II, 
THE AGENCY' S DENIAL OF LICENSURE TO DR. 
FUSSELL WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. THE 
AGENCY' S FINDINGS CANNOT BE SUPPORTED UNDER 
THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OR "WHOLE RECORD 
TEST. " 
The single most significant factor rendering the Agency' s 
decision arbitrary and ca.pricious in this case is that the Agency 
did not consider the course work completed by Dr. Fussell. It is 
undisputed that 80-90% of the courses completed by Petitioner were 
either psychology courses offered through an American Psychological 
Association (APA) approved program or crosslisted for credit in 
those programs. (Findings of Fact No. 11 R. 480. ) Fifty-eight 
percent of the courses completed by Dr. Fussell were offered by the 
APA approved and "Designated Doctoral Programs in Psychology" 
listed psychology departments at Vanderbilt University. Id. 
Fussell's doctoral dissertation was psychological in nature, 
supervised by three licensed psychologists. (R. 24; 51-52. ) She 
completed a course in ethics and an APA approved internship at the 
University of Utah and excelled as one of the two top students ever 
to participate in that program. (R. 240 and 218; R. 49-51, 58-60, 
63-65 and 68-70. ) Had Fussell completed the same course work and 
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experience and submitted the same dissertation at the University of 
Utah she would have qualified for a doctoral degree in counseling 
psychology. (R. 52. ) She has completed the distribution 
requirements required by the regulations interpreting the Utah 
statute. The Agency' s own witness, Dr. Addie Fuhrman, acknowledged 
that fact. However, in evaluating her application, the Board 
failed to evaluate her course work or the descriptions of those 
courses. Rather, testimony of Drs. Malouf and Shenkenberg 
testimony indicates that the Board relied for its decision upon 
criteria which are either 1) conclusions without appropriate 
foundation or 2) requirements not disclosed in regulations, which 
run, afoul of the Supreme Court' s concerns in Athay v. State 
Department of Business Regulation, 626 P. 2d 965 (Utah 1981). In 
that case, the Utah Supreme Court announced that "it is the 
responsibility of the administrative body to formulate, publish and 
make available to concerned persons rules which are sufficiently 
definite and clear that persons of ordinary intelligence will be 
able to understand and abide by them. " 626 P. 2d 968. (Emphasis 
added. ) 
Given the Agency' s failure to consider the course work 
completed by Dr. Fussell, the Agency' s conclusions regarding Dr. 
Fussell' s degree are conclusory and without foundation. As such 
they cannot support the findings of the Board respecting Dr. 
Fussell' s doctoral degree. Without reviewing Dr. Fussell' s course 
work, the Agency could not possibly evaluate her program of studies 
or determine whether she had obtained a doctoral degree based upon 
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a program of studies whose content was primarily psychological. 
The Agency has noted in its Brief, page 12, that Dr. Malouf 
testified that brochures did not state that their intent was to 
train psychologists, and that Dr. Fussell' s program did not appear 
to be a psychology program. Because he did not review her program, 
Dr. Malouf s conclusion could only be determined from the four 
brief paragraphs from the catalog introducing the Human Development 
Counseling Department at Peabody/Vanderbilt. Dr. Malouf expressed 
a concern that "the program outlined by Fussell [the one he did not 
review] seemed extremely limited and was not intended to train a 
psychologist." (R. 127-129.) Without reviewing Dr. Fussell's 
transcript to determine what courses she had taken in psychological 
research, Dr. Malouf opined that a program that de-emphasizes 
research to that extent does not qualify to train psychologists. 
Without reviewing Dr. Fussell' s transcript or considering the 
courses she actually completed, Dr. Malouf was concerned that Dr. 
Fussell' s program did not have the necessary focus or emphasis on 
psychology. And without reviewing her transcript to determine that 
she completed her courses with A' s and B' s, he was concerned that 
there was no process by which someone could be disqualified or 
taken out of the program if they were failing or did not have the 
proper skills or the personal traits to become a psychologist. (R. 
130-132. ) While Dr. Malouf s concerns might be legitimate in the 
abstract, given his failure to review Dr. Fussell' s course work and 
her transcript, Dr. Malouf s conclusions are without foundation and 
unwarranted respecting Dr. Fussell. 
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Two other factors render the Agency' s decision arbitrary and 
capricious. After their unfounded conclusions regarding Dr. 
Fussell's program of studies, the Agency' s witnesses expressed 
further concern that the Human Development Counseling Program at 
Peabody Vanderbilt was not APA approved. See testimony of Dr. 
Fuhrman, passim. Yet, at R. 105, the Agency admits that nothing in 
the regulations or the statute require APA accreditation of a 
doctoral degree program. Likewise, the Agency' s witnesses were 
concerned that the Human Development Counseling Program at George 
Peabody was not listed in the publication entitled "Designated 
Doctoral Programs in Psychology'1 (hereafter " DDPP" ) Yet in its 
responding brief, the Agency concedes that such a listing is not a 
licensing requirement. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-19). To the 
extent the Agency' s denial of licensure was based on these two 
undisclosed factors, the decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
In her opening brief, Dr. Fussell maintained that any 
requirement that the degree granting program be APA approved or 
listed in DDPP violated the requirements of Athay, supra, because 
these requirements are not published, available to concerned 
persons and thus not sufficiently definite and clear that 
applicants might be able to understand and abide by them. The 
Agency now concedes that neither factor is a requirement of Utah 
law for licensing of applicants. The Agency accuses Fussell of 
attempting to distract the court from "the more relevant issues" by 
even raising the argument. (Agency' s Brief, p. 19. ) But if a DDPP 
listing or APA approval are not prerequisites to qualification of 
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a doctoral degree for licensure, then why did the Agency' s 
witnesses express concern that Dr. Fussell' s program lacked them? 
If these are requirements, undisclosed as they are, they violate 
Athay. because there is no "objective, identifiable standard 
against which the [applicant's] qualifications could be judged." 
Athay, 626 P. 2d at 966. If such designations are even considered 
in determining the intent and viability of a program of studies, 
they should be disclosed under Athay in the interests of due 
process of law. 
If DDPP listing and APA approval are not requirements to 
qualify a doctoral degree, then the only basis the Board had to 
conclude that Fussell' s degree did not qualify her was four 
introductory paragraphs in the course catalog generally describing 
the degree granting program Human Development Counseling at 
Peabody/Vanderbilt. If all Dr. Fussell had done was to complete a 
standardized program for training of counselors or teachers 
described in that catalog, the Board' s licensure denial might be 
more easily understood. But the record is undisputed (and the 
State even admits) that this is not what Dr. Fussell did. She and 
her faculty advisors structured her program to accommodate her 
interest in practicing psychology as a counseling psychologist on 
the doctoral level.3 She completed all distribution requirements 
and course work set forth in Regulation 4(i) that are required of 
3
 The State curiously criticizes Dr. Fussell for designing her 
own program (Agency Brief, p. 13) at the same time it judges her on 
the basis of four general, introductory paragraphs out of the 
course catalog. How the State can synthesize those two positions 
into denying the license escapes Petitioner. 
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other applicants for a Utah license. Some 80-90% of her courses 
were offered by or cross-listed for credit in the Psychology 
Department at Peabody/Vanderbilt. 4 Fifty-eight percent of the 
courses that Dr. Fussell completed were taken in that APA approved 
program, where Dr. Fussell, along with other psychology students, 
learned under the tutelage of eminent psychologists teaching the 
courses. Dr. Fussell completed this program of studies with 
outstanding grades. Since the Agency failed to consider these 
facts in concluding that Dr. Fussell' s degree granting program did 
not qualify her for licensure, it is obvious that the only basis 
for the conclusion is the four short paragraphs in the course 
catalog. That conclusion is erroneous and arbitrary because the 
State did not review Dr. Fussell' s degree. 
The agency notes that Dr. Fussell does not have a basic 
"right" to a doctoral level psychologist's license. Fussell has 
never contended that she has a "right" to practice as a psycholo-
gist. What Fussell does contend is that she has a right to have 
her application for licensure considered on a basis which is 
consistent with due process and equal protection of the laws. By 
refusing to consider her course work and relying completely upon a 
four paragraph general description of a department in a course 
catalog, which concededly does not reflect Fussell' s program of 
studies which even the Agency asserts Dr. Fussell designed for 
herself with the help of her faculty advisors (see Agency Brief, p. 
Notably, the Psychology Department at Peabody/Vanderbilt is 
APA approved and is listed in DDPP. 
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29), the Agency has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying 
this license. The point is not that Fussell has a right to a 
license but that Fussell has a right not to be treated arbitrarily 
or to be judged by virtue of vague, or unwritten, undisclosed 
requirements. 
The Agency argues that its regulations were written for the 
purpose of clarifying the requirements for licensure as a psycholo-
gist. That is precisely what Fussell contends the regulations do 
not do. 5 The Agency expresses concerns that Dr. Fussell' s program 
did not focus on psychology. Yet, the Agency had no basis for 
those concerns. It did not review Dr. Fussell' s program. It did 
not* consider the course work she completed, or the descriptions of 
those courses that Dr. Fussell provided. Without this analysis, 
the Agency' s determination cannot be but arbitrary and capricious 
and a denial of Dr. Fussell' s rights to due process of law. 
POINT III, 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW MUST TAKE INTO CONSI-
DERATION THAT THE REGULATIONS RELIED UPON BY 
THE AGENCY TO DENY DR. FUSSELL LICENSURE ARE 
OUT OF HARMONY WITH THE STATUTE AND ARE A 
NULLITY. 
The Agency has apparently misunderstood the standard of review 
The Agency erroneously argues that prior to receiving her 
degree, Dr. Fussell had reason to know she did not qualify for 
licensure in Utah. However, with the exception of one ethics 
course, Dr. Fussell completed her course work prior to coming Utah. 
But even if she had not, the requirements in the regulations are 
not so definitive and definite as to give notice to an applicant 
what is required. How could anyone know from reading the regula-
tions that an introductory, departmental catalog description, 
irrespective of course work actually completed, would be 
determinative of one' s qualifications to be licensed? 
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propounded by Petitioner. The Agency has argued, and Petitioner 
agrees, that the standard of review is "an intermediate standard", 
covering "the Board's conclusions, [which] must be reasonable and 
rational' as measured against the language and purpose of the 
governing legislation. ' " In addition, however, whether an agency 
has properly interpreted its statutory powers and authority is a 
question of law wherein no deference is given to the agency' s view 
of the law. Bevans v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 790 P. 2d 573 
(Utah App. 1990). To the extent that the Agency has improperly 
interpreted its statutory powers and authority or misconstrued the 
statute in adopting regulations to implement the enabling statute, 
the review is based upon a correction of error standard. In this 
case, the Agency has denied Petitioner licensure based upon a 
regulation that improperly interprets the Agency' s statutory 
powers. To the extent it has done so, the Agency' s conclusions in 
this case are not reasonable or rational. 
The enabling statute governing this application requires that 
the applicant have completed a doctoral degree based upon a program 
of studies whose content was primarily psychological. In inter-
preting that statute, the Agency has promulgated Regulation 4(b) 
(R153-25-8(4)(b)), which provides that the program wherever it may 
be administratively housed, must be clearly identified and labeled 
as a psychology program. The "program" to which the regulation 
refers is an administrative unit, as only administrative units or 
university departments may be "administratively housed." The 
regulation also requires that the program be identified and labeled 
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as a psychology program. 
Neither of these requirements promulgated by the Agency is in 
harmony with the statute. While the statute does not require it, 
the Agency has engrafted to the licensure process the requirement 
that an applicant obtain a degree in psychology. Nothing in the 
statute allows the Agency to do so. The statute only requires that 
an applicant's degree be "based on a program of studies whose 
content was primarily psychological. M The statute does not refer 
to an institutional unit or department at a university. It refers 
to the degree completed by the applicant. The degree must be 
"based on" a program of studies, not "from" a program of studies. 
To the extent Regulation 4(b) requires a degree in psychology or 
matriculation from an institutional unit labeled as a psychology 
program it is out of harmony with the statute and is a nullity.6 
Contrary to the Agency7 s assertion that Tennessee' s standards 
are lower (Agency Brief, p. 26), the Tenness€$e statute under which 
Petitioner is already licensed is very similar to the Utah statute. 
Both statutes give the licensing boards similar discretionary 
judgment to accept applications. However, the regulations the 
Other provisions of Regulation 4 indicate that in 
promulgating the rule the Agency has misinterpreted the statute. 
The focus of the regulation is on "institutional entities." See 
Rule 4(c) (the psychology program must stand as a recognizable, 
coherent organizational entity within the institution). Regulation 
4(f) (there must be an identifiable psychology faculty and a 
psychologist responsible for the program. ) All of these require-
ments in the regulation indicate a focus by the Agency upon 
institutional departments or entities as opposed to the qualifi-
cations of an individual applicant. To this extent, the regulation 
is misdirected. 
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Agency has promulgated under the Utah statute have caused the 
Agency to abdicate its responsibility and decline to exercise that 
judgement. The purpose of the Utah statute is to allow licensure 
to a candidate who has completed a program of studies whose content 
is primarily psychological. The Utah licensing board thus has a 
responsibility to examine a candidate' s program of studies. The 
Agency cannot outright reject any program that isn't labeled 
"psychological." But that is what has happened to Petitioner's 
application. Despite the fact that she has undisputedly completed 
a program of studies well within the purview of the statute, the 
Agency has declined to even look at her program, much less license 
her, on the sole ground that her program was not adequately 
labeled. 
To the extent the Agency relied on Regulation 4(b) in denying 
Dr. Fussell's application, the Agency' s denial is not reasonable or 
rational in light of the purposes of the enabling statute. To the 
extent the Regulation allows the Agency to ignore Petitioner' s 
actual program of studies and deny her licensure based on the 
labeling of her degree or based on four general introductory 
paragraphs from a course catalog, the regulation and the Agency' s 
action are out of harmony with the statute. The Agency' s arbitrary 
disqualification of Petitioner given its failure to review the 
course of studies she completed must be reversed and the Agency 
directed to proceed with the licensing process. 
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